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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Clayton Prince Tanksley is an actor and producer who 
lives in Philadelphia. In 2005, he created a three-episode 
television pilot, Cream, for which he received a copyright. In 
2015, Fox Television debuted a new series, Empire, from 
award-winning producer and director Lee Daniels. Shortly 
thereafter, Tanksley filed suit, claiming that Empire infringed 
on his copyright of Cream. The District Court found no 
substantial similarity between the two shows and dismissed 
Tanksley’s complaint. For the reasons stated below, we will 
affirm.   
I 
A. Factual Background 
 In 2005, Tanksley wrote, produced, directed, filmed, 
starred in, and copyrighted three episodes of Cream, a show 
about an African-American record executive who runs his own 
hip-hop label. In 2008, Tanksley participated in an event called 
the Philly Pitch hosted by the Greater Philadelphia Film Office. 
The Philly Pitch provided an opportunity for aspiring local 
writers to pitch movie concepts to a panel of entertainment 
professionals. Lee Daniels served as a panel member. 
 During his presentation to the panel, Tanksley pitched 
an idea unrelated to Cream. At a meet-and-greet following the 
pitches, however, Tanksley spoke with Daniels one-on-one, 
and the two discussed the show. Daniels apparently expressed 
interest, so Tanksley provided him with a DVD and a script of 
the series. Tanksley’s complaint does not allege any further 
contact between him and Daniels. In 2015, nearly seven years 
later, Fox aired the debut episode of the Daniels-created series 
Empire, which also revolves around an African-American 
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record executive who runs his own music label.  
 The following are brief descriptions of each show.1 
Cream 
 Winston St. James is the founder and owner of Big Balla 
Records based in Philadelphia. Cream documents the 
challenges Winston faces as he attempts to run his record label 
while dealing with a variety of personal and family problems. 
Cream features numerous, prolonged sex scenes and portrays 
Winston and other characters as highly promiscuous. The show 
has several story arcs of varying prominence; the main three 
are outlined below. 
 Herpes: Throughout the show, Winston has a number of 
sexual forays with various characters, including his two 
assistants, Chantal and Tiffany. Towards the end of the first 
episode, Winston grabs his groin in obvious pain and instructs 
an assistant to schedule a doctor’s appointment for him 
immediately. Early in the second episode, Winston learns from 
his doctor that he has herpes. In this scene, the dialogue 
between Winston and his doctor is conspicuously educational 
for a drama, and includes many clinical details about herpes 
prevention and treatment. Episode two concludes with 
Tanksley (out of character) delivering a lengthy public service 
announcement about sexually transmitted diseases. In the third 
episode, the audience learns that Winston’s two assistants also 
have herpes, and there are intra-office recriminations over the 
source of the outbreak. At the end of the third episode, Winston 
learns that Chantal’s husband has been visiting a prostitute who 
has herpes, dramatically revealing her as the unexpected source 
                                              
1 The District Court provided an exceptionally 
thorough summation of each show, the most relevant portions 
of which we have attempted to distill here. 
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of the outbreak at Big Balla Records. 
 Domestic Abuse: Early in the first episode, Winston’s 
younger sister, Angelica, is physically abused by her 
boyfriend, Shekwan. He is upset over Angelica’s failure to get 
him an audition with Big Balla Records. After discovering the 
source of Angelica’s injuries, Winston agrees to give Shekwan 
an audition, but also arranges to have him murdered. The first 
episode ends with two of Winston’s associates shooting 
Shekwan many times from the shadows of an alley. Following 
the first episode, the actress who plays Angelica delivers a 
public service announcement about domestic abuse. In the 
second episode, Shekwan survives the shooting and makes a 
full—miraculous, even—recovery. Winston then allows 
Shekwan to make a record, but attempts to sabotage him with 
a comically bad song. To Winston’s chagrin, the song ends up 
being massively successful, with many suppliers calling 
Winston’s office directly to order several thousand copies. 
 Company Takeover: Winston’s ex-girlfriend, Brenda, 
and his father, Sammy, are introduced in the final scene of the 
second episode. The audience learns that Winston’s younger 
brother and sister are actually his and Brenda’s children. 
Winston’s parents raised the children because of Brenda’s past 
drug abuse. Sammy—now apparently estranged from his ex-
wife and Winston—pledges to help Brenda get her children 
back and vows to take control of Big Balla Records. Sammy 
and Brenda then have sex and the episode ends. In the third 
episode, Winston’s mother, Nora, gets in a fight with Brenda 
and suffers a fatal heart attack. At her funeral, the audience 
learns for the first time that Nora owned fifty percent of Big 
Balla Records. Sammy confronts Winston and demands Nora’s 
share of the company, which Winston refuses. Later, Sammy 
learns that Nora gave her shares to her grandchildren, i.e., 
Winston’s children. Following another sex scene with Brenda, 
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Sammy schemes to drive a wedge between Winston and his 
children by revealing the truth about their parentage. In this 
way, Sammy hopes to gain control of Big Balla Records. After 
learning that Winston is actually her father, Angelica tells him 
that she never wants to see him again. The third episode ends 
with the actress who plays Nora delivering a public service 
message about the apparent crisis of grandparents raising their 
grandchildren. 
Empire 
 Lucious Lyon is the founder and CEO of Empire 
Entertainment, a prominent record label based in New York 
City. Lucious rose from a life of poverty and crime in 
Philadelphia to become a music and entertainment mogul. The 
members of Lucious’ immediate family also play central roles 
in the series. As outlined below, Empire’s first season is 
defined by several story arcs. 
 Succession: Unquestionably, Empire’s main storyline 
concerns the question of who will succeed Lucious as head of 
Empire Entertainment. In the pilot episode, Lucious is 
diagnosed with ALS and told that he has only three years to 
live. Lucius keeps his illness a secret, but the prognosis 
prompts him to tell his three sons that he will soon choose one 
of them as his successor. Lucious’ decision is complicated by 
the fact that each of his sons has a unique set of talents and 
liabilities. His oldest son, Andre, is a Wharton graduate and the 
current CFO of Empire Entertainment. Andre, however, lacks 
musical talent, and Lucious, as an acclaimed artist in his own 
right, believes that Empire should be led by a musician. The 
middle son, Jamal, is a talented R&B singer and songwriter, 
but struggles to gain his father’s approval because he is gay. 
Due to a presumed hostility to homosexuality in the African-
American community, Lucious is doubtful that Jamal could 
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successfully lead Empire Entertainment. Lucious’ youngest 
son, Hakeem, is an emerging, charismatic rapper who 
embodies the hip-hop lifestyle. Lucious initially favors 
Hakeem because of his star potential, but Hakeem’s 
immaturity and undisciplined behavior force Lucius to 
reconsider. 
 Lucious’ Past: Before becoming an entertainment 
mogul, Lucious dealt drugs and committed various other 
crimes, some violent. In various ways throughout the series, 
Lucious’ past threatens to undermine everything he has built at 
Empire. In the pilot episode, Lucious’ ex-wife, Cookie, is 
released from prison after serving a seventeen-year sentence. 
The audience learns that Cookie took the rap for Lucious so he 
could use proceeds from a drug sale to launch his career and, 
eventually, Empire Entertainment. Upon her release, Cookie, 
whom Lucious divorced shortly after her incarceration began, 
confronts Lucious at Empire headquarters and demands fifty 
percent of the company. When Lucious resists, Cookie 
threatens to inform the SEC that Empire Entertainment was 
started with drug money, a particularly potent threat in light of 
Empire’s upcoming IPO. 
Later in the pilot, Lucious’ longtime friend Bunkie 
attempts to blackmail him by threatening to tell police about 
Lucious’ past crimes. Lucious arranges to meet Bunkie by the 
river at night, and shoots him in the face. The investigation into 
Bunkie’s death, and Lucious’ suspected involvement, play out 
over the course of the series.  
B. Procedural History 
 Tanksley filed his initial complaint in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging copyright infringement and 
several derivative claims. He then amended the complaint one 
month later. Following a hearing on Defendants’ motions to 
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dismiss, the District Court permitted Tanksley to further amend 
his complaint. 
 The operative complaint asserts that Cream and Empire 
are “in many respects strikingly substantially similar,” Compl. 
¶ 39, and contains a detailed analysis—including dozens of 
screenshots from each show—documenting the alleged 
similarities. The District Court conducted four days of 
hearings, during which each party presented video excerpts 
from the shows to demonstrate similarity or dissimilarity. 
 The court then granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, 
finding that Tanksley’s complaint fails to state a claim because 
the two shows are not substantially similar as a matter of law. 
Tanksley timely appealed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1338, and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. “Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss is 
plenary.” Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 
F.3d 487, 489 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017). 
III 
On appeal, Tanksley raises two primary arguments, one 
procedural and one substantive. Procedurally, he argues that 
the question of substantial similarity is too fact-intensive to be 
resolved at the pleading stage. Substantively, Tanksley argues 
that the District Court erred in finding no substantial similarity 
between Cream and Empire as a matter of law. 
A. Copyright Infringement and Rule 12(b)(6) 
 In order to prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff 
must establish that his copyrighted work and the infringing 
work are “substantially similar.” Dam Things from Den. v. 
Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 561–62 (3d Cir. 2002). This 
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term’s meaning will be discussed more fully below. For 
present purposes, it is enough to observe that substantial 
similarity “is usually an extremely close question of fact,” 
which is why even “summary judgment has traditionally been 
disfavored in copyright litigation.” Twentieth Century–Fox 
Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.6 (9th Cir. 
1983). Nevertheless, if “no reasonable jury” could find that two 
works are substantially similar, then “summary judgment for a 
copyright defendant” has been considered “appropriate.” 
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296–97 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). And in recent years, several Courts of 
Appeals have taken the next step by affirming dismissals under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after finding no 
substantial similarity as a matter of law. See 3 William F. Patry, 
Patry on Copyright § 9:86.50 (Mar. 2018 update) (citing 
published opinions from the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits). Such dismissals, which were formerly rare 
(but not unprecedented, e.g., Christianson v. W. Pub. Co., 149 
F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945)), are now more common.2  
In justifying dismissals of copyright infringement 
claims, courts follow a now-familiar logical progression. First, 
in evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts are not limited to the 
four corners of the complaint, but may also consider evidence 
“integral to or explicitly relied upon” therein. In re Rockefeller 
Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory 
                                              
2 Panels of our Court have affirmed dismissals of 
copyright infringement claims in two nonprecedential 
opinions. Tanikumi v. Walt Disney Co., 616 F. App’x 515 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (nonprecedential); Winstead v. 




Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). The 
copyrighted and allegedly infringing works will necessarily be 
integral to an infringement complaint and are therefore 
properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6). Next, courts have 
justified consideration of substantial similarity at the pleading 
stage by noting that “no discovery or fact-finding is typically 
necessary, because ‘what is required is only a visual 
comparison of the works.’” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC 
v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 
1991)). Finally, having limited the focus to the works 
themselves, courts will dismiss an infringement action if they 
conclude that “no trier of fact could rationally determine the 
two [works] to be substantially similar.” 3 Melville B. Nimmer 
& David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.10[B][3] (rev. 
ed. 2018). 
The District Court followed this precise line of 
reasoning in dismissing Tanksley’s complaint. First, it properly 
considered the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works in 
their entireties. The complaint does not have recordings of 
either show formally attached as an exhibit, but it includes 
dozens of side-by-side screenshots of each, so both shows are 
unquestionably integral to the complaint. Second, the District 
Court properly concluded that no additional evidence or expert 
analysis would be relevant to the question of substantial 
similarity. On appeal, Tanksley criticizes the court for 
rendering its decision “without the benefit of witness 
testimony, documentary evidence, or expert analysis,” 
Appellant’s Br. 14, but fails to explain how any such evidence 
could have been relevant. It would not have been. On 
substantial similarity, the question is how the works “would 
appear to a layman viewing [them] side by side,” Universal 
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975), 
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and we have rejected the usefulness of experts in answering 
this question, id. at 907.3 
In ratifying the District Court’s approach, we do not 
mean to minimize the central role of the jury in cases where 
substantial similarity might reasonably be found. But where no 
reasonable juror could find substantial similarity, justice is best 
served by putting “a swift end to meritless litigation.” Hoehling 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 
1980) (quoting Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 
613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980)). We conclude that the 
District Court properly considered the question of substantial 
similarity under Rule 12(b)(6). We next evaluate whether it 
arrived at the correct answer. 
B. Substantial Similarity 
1. Background Principles 
 To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must show: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and 
(2) unauthorized copying of original elements of the plaintiff’s 
work.” Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace 
Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). This second 
element—unauthorized copying—itself comprises two 
(frequently conflated) components: actual copying and 
material appropriation of the copyrighted work. Castle Rock 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d 
                                              
3 We have expressed more openness to expert 
testimony when the works at issue are highly technical in 
nature, e.g., computer programs. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow 
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 1986). 
But television shows, like “novels, plays, and paintings,” are 
precisely the kinds of works for which the ordinary observer 
test is best suited. Id. at 1232. 
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Cir. 1998); 3 Patry, supra, § 9:91. The conceptual distinction 
between actual copying and material appropriation is 
foundational to copyright law because not all instances of 
actual copying give rise to liability, and, conversely, without 
proof of actual copying the amount of similarity between two 
works is immaterial. Because we conclude that Tanksley has 
failed to plausibly allege material appropriation, we do not 
address the separate question of whether the complaint 
plausibly alleges actual copying. Nevertheless, a clear 
understanding of both components is essential to our analysis. 
a. Actual Copying 
Actual copying focuses on whether the defendant did, 
in fact, use the copyrighted work in creating his own. If the 
defendant truly created his work independently, then no 
infringement has occurred, irrespective of similarity. Yurman 
Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2001); see 
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 
1924) (L. Hand, J.) (using the example of two mapmakers and 
noting that “if each be faithful, identity is inevitable,” but, 
“[e]ach being the result of original work, the second will be 
protected, quite regardless of its lack of novelty”). On the other 
hand, it is no defense that a defendant copied a protected 
work—such as a song—subconsciously. Three Boys Music 
Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482–84 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding plaintiff’s “twenty-five-years-after-the-fact-
subconscious copying claim”). 
In the great majority of cases, a plaintiff will lack direct 
evidence of copying, which may instead be shown through 
circumstantial evidence of access and similarity. 3 Paul 
Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 9:6.1 (Supp. 2008). There 
is a critical, though often misunderstood, distinction between 
“substantial similarity” with respect to copying and 
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“substantial similarity” with respect to material appropriation. 
Two works can be “substantially similar” so as to support an 
inference of copying, yet not “substantially similar” in the 
sense that the later work materially appropriates the 
copyrighted work. Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907. To clearly mark 
this distinction, we prefer the term “probative similarity” in the 
copying context, while reserving “substantial similarity” for 
the question of material appropriation. See Dam Things from 
Den., 290 F.3d at 562 & nn.19–20. This distinction has critical 
analytical consequences for what evidence may be considered 
at each step of the infringement analysis. On the question of 
copying, the finder of fact may consider any aspect of the 
works that supports an inference of copying, even elements 
that are incapable of copyright protection. See Laureyssens v. 
Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1992); 3 Patry, 
supra, § 9:19. By contrast, when assessing material 
appropriation, i.e., substantial similarity, only similarities in 
protectable expression may be considered. Laureyssens, 964 
F.2d at 139–40. Titles, for example, are quintessentially 
unprotectable by copyright, but the fact that two works share 
the same title may be considered as evidence that the later work 
was copied from the earlier. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 
1362 (9th Cir. 1990).  
b. Unlawful Appropriation 
Actual copying alone is insufficient to support an 
infringement claim because a copyright only protects the 
holder’s particular creative expression, not his ideas. At a 
certain level, copying is perfectly permissible, even expected. 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d 
Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.) (“[T]he defendants were entitled to 
use, not only all that had gone before, but even the plaintiffs’ 
contribution itself, if they drew from it only the more general 
patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its ‘expression.’”). If 
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copying is proven (or conceded), the defendant is only liable 
for infringement if his work is substantially similar to the 
protected elements of the copyrighted work.  
In its basic formulation, substantial similarity asks 
whether “a ‘lay-observer’ would believe that the copying was 
of protectible aspects of the copyrighted work.” Dam Things 
from Den., 290 F.3d at 562, or—again quoting Judge Hand—
whether “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the 
disparities [in the two works], would be disposed to overlook 
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same,” Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960), quoted in Dam Things from Den., 290 F.3d at 562. 
To answer this question, the trier of fact performs a side-by-
side comparison of the works and, excluding any unprotectable 
elements, assesses whether the two works are substantially 
similar. Dam Things from Den., 290 F.3d at 566. 
The difficulty of this analysis derives from the 
impossibility of drawing an exact line between what 
constitutes an idea—which is not protected—and an 
expression—which is. This challenge is particularly acute in 
the case of dramatic works. As Judge Hand described:  
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a 
great number of patterns of increasing generality 
will fit equally well, as more and more of the 
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no 
more than the most general statement of what the 
play is about, and at times might consist only of 
its title; but there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the 
use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended. 
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Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, 
and nobody ever can. 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 
1930) (citation omitted). Tanksley’s complaint exemplifies 
these difficulties. His copyright undoubtedly protected more 
than the literal expression in Cream, but it is difficult to draw 
a principled line to determine at what level of abstraction the 
expression in Cream loses its protection and becomes a mere 
idea. Is the premise of a television show based on an African-
American record executive expression or idea? What about a 
record executive dealing with family strife? Or dealing with 
family strife and his relatives’ efforts to gain control of his 
company? 
 Adding to the difficulty is the need to maintain focus on 
the protected elements of Tanksley’s work, not the prominence 
of any such elements in the defendant’s work. Even if what was 
taken from Cream forms but a minor element in Empire, 
infringement has occurred so long as what was taken was a 
material part of Tanksley’s work. Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985) (“A taking 
may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with 
respect to the infringing work.”). 
 Seeking to impose a semblance of order on this “at 
large” analysis, courts have developed several methods and 
principles for evaluating substantial similarity. In works that 
involve a mix of protected and unprotected elements, as is the 
case here, the first step is to identify and exclude from the 
substantial similarity analysis any unprotected material. In 
dramatic works, an important category of unprotected content 
is scènes à faire, or plot elements that flow predictably from a 
general idea. In a film about a college fraternity, for example, 
“parties, alcohol, co-eds, and wild behavior” would all be 
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considered scènes à faire and not valid determinants of 
substantial similarity. Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 
F.3d 283, 296 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 After excising all unprotectable ideas and scènes à faire, 
courts have sought to compare dramatic works across a number 
of components: plot and sequence of events, dialogue, 
characters, theme, mood, setting, and pace. See Robert C. 
Osterberg & Eric C. Osterberg, Substantial Similarity in 
Copyright Law, § 4:2–8 (2011). At the same time, however, 
substantial similarity can be grounded in a work’s “total 
concept and feel,” Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 
996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995), and courts are admonished not to lose 
sight of material similarities by “balkanizing a unified 
copyrighted work into constituent elements, which are then 
compared in isolation,” 3 Patry, supra, § 9:73. The total 
concept and feel approach recognizes that “a work may be 
copyrightable even though it is entirely a compilation of 
unprotectable elements,” because “[w]hat is protectable . . . is 
‘the author’s original contributions’—the original way in 
which the author has ‘selected, coordinated, and arranged’ the 
elements of his or her work.” Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003–04 
(citation omitted) (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350, 358 (1991)). There is 
obvious tension between the imperative to filter out 
unprotectable elements of a work while keeping sight of the 
work’s total concept and feel (which necessarily includes 
unprotectable elements). We reconcile these competing 
considerations by recalling that the basic inquiry remains 
whether an ordinary observer would perceive that the 
defendant has copied protected elements of the plaintiff’s 
work. Other filters, e.g., scènes à faire, total concept and feel, 
etc., while helpful, are merely tools to assist the trier of fact in 
reaching a proper conclusion. 
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2. Application to Cream and Empire 
 With these principles in mind, we conclude that, 
superficial similarities notwithstanding, Cream and Empire are 
not substantially similar as a matter of law. This conclusion 
flows unavoidably from a comparison of the two shows’ 
characters, settings, and storylines.  
 As a preliminary matter, we note that the shared premise 
of the shows—an African-American, male record executive—
is unprotectable.  These characters fit squarely within the class 
of “prototypes” to which copyright protection has never 
extended. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122; see Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 
330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that only 
characters with “consistent, widely identifiable traits,” e.g., 
Godzilla, James Bond, and Rocky Balboa, have received 
copyright protection). The scope of Cream’s protection, 
therefore, extends only to Tanksley’s particular expression of 
this unprotectable idea.  
a. Main Characters and Setting 
 In Cream, Winston St. James runs Big Balla Records, 
and while he is clearly the man in charge, the label itself is not 
presented as being particularly glamorous or high profile. 
Winston appears to run the label largely by himself, his office 
is small and dated, and aspiring talent audition in what appears 
to be a dilapidated dance studio that Winston does not even 
appear to own. In Empire, Lucious Lyon’s company, Empire 
Entertainment, is portrayed as a massive corporate 
conglomerate, with stakes in music, clothing, and 
entertainment. Lucious’ life is portrayed as the epitome of 
luxury: lavish offices and homes, state-of-the-art studios, and 
yacht parties.  
 Lucious is a celebrated artist in his own right, and is 
portrayed as having an innate ability to recognize talent and get 
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the best out of his performers. Winston, by contrast, does not 
appear to be a musician of any sort. And while artists in Cream 
crave the opportunity to join his label, Winston is not depicted 
as having any notable artistic or promotional ability. As for the 
characters’ backgrounds, Cream reveals little about Winston 
aside from the fact that he fathered two children with a drug-
addicted woman, with these children being raised under the 
impression that Winston is their older brother. In contrast, 
Lucious’ background—vividly depicted in flashbacks—forms 
a central dramatic element in Empire. Lucious came up as a 
drug dealer and used proceeds from drug sales to fund his 
initial recording venture. Empire also reveals that Lucious 
committed multiple drug-related murders in the past. The 
possibility that this information will come to light, and the risk 
it poses to Lucious’ fortune and freedom, are central dramatic 
elements in Empire. As these descriptions indicate, even if we 
assume that Winston and Lucious stem from the same 
unprotectable idea, the particular expressions of this idea are 
not substantially similar.  
b. Main Storylines 
 With regard to plot, the similarities between the shows 
likewise extend no farther than the bare abstraction of an 
African-American, male record executive. Cream’s plot 
largely, though not exclusively, revolves around Winston’s 
herpes diagnosis. In the first episode, Winston experiences 
groin pain of unknown origin. In the second episode, he is 
officially diagnosed with herpes, and it is suggested that one of 
his paramours has herpes as well. The second episode also 
concludes with a public service announcement about herpes 
and other sexually transmitted diseases. In the third episode, 
multiple additional characters learn that they have herpes, and 
Winston learns that the husband of one of his inamoratas was 
the original source of the outbreak. This last piece of 
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information is revealed in Cream’s final scene and serves as 
the show’s dénouement. While Cream includes several other 
storylines, the herpes element is the only one woven into all 
three of its episodes. 
 The Empire plot focuses most concertedly on the 
question of which Lyon son will be chosen to succeed Lucious 
as the head of Empire Records. The sons each have a distinct 
personality and a unique blend of artistic and business savvy, 
which fuels the dramatic tension over whom Lucious will 
select. This succession storyline, which dominates Empire, has 
no analog in Cream. Empire also prominently features 
Lucious’ ex-wife, recently released from prison, who is 
seeking to gain control of fifty percent of the company and 
becomes embroiled in the conflict over Lucious’ corporate 
heir.4 
 Tanksley seeks to offset these broad similarities by 
highlighting particular snippets common to each show. To take 
a representative example, Tanksley argues that substantial 
similarity can be found in the fact that Lucious and Winston 
are both diagnosed with a disease in the course of their 
                                              
4 It is true that Cream contains a secondary storyline 
wherein Winston’s father attempts to wrest control of the 
company from him. However, in the context of a show about a 
company, the fact that a storyline would involve who controls 
that company is neither surprising nor protectable. Cf. Walker 
v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(identifying foot chases and morale problems as scènes à faire 
in police dramas). In addition, the expression of this idea in 
each show is starkly different. Lucious’ ex-wife, Cookie, 
helped him found Empire and has a legitimate claim to her 
sought-after share of the company. Winston’s father is 
motivated by pure greed.  
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respective series. The ultimate significance of this comparison 
is equally representative: any facial plausibility fades upon 
examination. In Empire, Lucious’ diagnosis of ALS—which is 
fatal—creates the urgency to choose his successor, the focal 
point of the entire series. In Cream, Winston’s diagnosis of 
herpes—which is painful—merely serves to interfere with his 
romantic liaisons and introduces the venereal whodunit that 
follows. “[R]andom similarities” are insufficient to establish 
substantial similarity. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 590 
(2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 
1356 (9th Cir. 1984)). After all, both Mozart and Metallica 
composed in E minor. The question is whether, in view of such 
similarities, “a ‘lay-observer’ would believe that the copying 
was of protectible aspects of the copyrighted work.” Dam 
Things from Den., 290 F.3d at 562. 
 In considering the protectable elements of Cream, we 
are convinced that “no reasonable jury, properly instructed, 
could find that the two works are substantially similar.” Gaito, 
602 F.3d at 63 (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 
720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983)). As the District Court 
concluded, even when “viewing the comparisons in the light 
most favorable to [Tanksley], . . . Cream and Empire contain 
dramatically different expressions of plot, characters, theme, 
mood, setting, dialogue, total concept, and overall feel.” 
Tanksley v. Daniels, 259 F. Supp. 3d 271, 294 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
Without substantial similarity, Tanksley’s complaint fails to 
state a claim of copyright infringement and was properly 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 
C. Derivative Claims 
 We will also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Tanksley’s assorted derivative claims. His claims of 
contributory copyright infringement are foreclosed by our 
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conclusion that he has not plausibly alleged direct 
infringement. See Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 
387 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 975 (2018). 
Tanksley’s misrepresentation claims against Daniels and his 
negligence claim against the Greater Philadelphia Film Office, 
having not been raised in his opening brief, are waived. Halle 
v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 230 n.17 
(3d Cir. 2016). His other negligence claims, being virtually 
indistinguishable from the infringement claims, are preempted 
by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see Dun & 
Bradstreet, 307 F.3d at 217–18. Finally, we will affirm the 
District Court’s determination that further amendment to the 
complaint would have been futile. Tanksley, 259 F. Supp. 3d 
at 304 n.14. 
IV 
We will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.  
